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1 
Essay 
Substantive Equality: A Perspective 
Catharine A. MacKinnon† 
Men have asked over the centuries a question that, in their hands, 
ironically becomes abstract: ―What is reality?‖ They have written 
complicated volumes on this question. The woman who was a battered 
wife and has escaped knows the answer: reality is when something is 
happening to you and you know it and can say it and when you say it 
other people understand what you mean and believe you. That is real-
ity, and the battered wife, imprisoned alone in a nightmare that is 
happening to her, has lost it and cannot find it anywhere.  
 
Andrea Dworkin, A Battered Wife Survives, in LETTERS FROM A WAR 
ZONE 100, 104 (1988).  
 
The emptiness of U.S. constitutional equal protection doc-
trine has long been apparent from its lack of reach to its shaky 
grasp on questions of sex inequality. When women are abused 
because they are women—physical aggression by male inti-
mates with legal impunity is cardinal and emblematic—almost 
never are the acts, or the systemic failure to prevent and sanc-
tion them, found to discriminate based on sex.1 The insecurity 
of women‘s person because of sex is still widely regarded as a 
fact of life rather than a shortfall of law, even as goals more 
conventionally set by sex equality law, such as equal pay, con-
tinue to be largely unrealized as well.2  
 
†  Time to conceive this article was supported by the Diane Middlebrook 
and Carl Djerassi Visiting Professorship at the Centre for Gender Studies, 
University of Cambridge, U.K., Lent Term, 2011. Research assistance was 
provided on short notice with immense competence by Lisa Cardyn. Copy-
right © 2011 by Catharine A. MacKinnon. 
 1. For discussion of cases attempting to establish equal protection viola-
tions in situations of domestic violence, see CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEX 
EQUALITY 717–22 (2d ed. 2007). Subsequent cases include Okin v. Village of 
Cornwall-on-Hudson Police Department, 577 F.3d 415, 438–39 (2d Cir. 2009).  
 2. Women recently employed full-time earned approximately eighty 
cents for each dollar earned by a man. U.S. DEP‘T OF LABOR & U.S. BUREAU OF 
 2 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [96:1 
 
That the empty formalism of legal equality in the United 
States is the limit of equal protection‘s visible horizon, not just 
its unconscious fallback position, was made explicit by the Su-
preme Court majority in Lawrence v. Texas.3 Explaining why 
due process was a preferable route for invalidating the criminal 
sodomy law at issue, the Court conceded that an equal protec-
tion analysis was ―a tenable argument‖ but rejected it because 
―[i]f protected conduct is made criminal and the law which does 
so remains unexamined for its substantive validity, its stigma 
might remain even if it were not enforceable as drawn for equal 
protection reasons.‖4 Equal protection examines a statute only 
for its framing, not for ―its substantive validity;‖ not for what it 
does, only how.5 Due process—intrinsically a procedural idea—
has a substantive component; a venerable line of cases makes 
clear, in my view, that its substance is morality.6 But the equal-
ity component of the Constitution cannot address the substance 
of a statute, only its mechanism.7 Curiously, it also seems that 
equal protection invalidation cannot eliminate the stigma of a 
statute that due process scrutiny would permit.8 At least at the 
lowest tier of scrutiny, where sexual orientation quite potently 
resides at the moment,9 a substantive equality jurisprudence 
not only does not exist, it is unthinkable. 
Perhaps stricter scrutiny permits the substance of social 
context and reality of the category to enter into legal considera-
 
LABOR STATISTICS, WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE: A DATABOOK 68 (2010), 
available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/wlf-databook-2010.pdf. 
 3. 539 U.S. 558, 574–75 (2003). 
 4. Id. (emphasis added).  
 5. Id. at 575.  
 6. Justice Harlan‘s widely cited dissent in Poe v. Ullman makes this tex-
tually clear at its origins. See 367 U.S. 497, 545–46 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing) (―[T]he very inclusion of the category of morality among state concerns 
indicates that society is not limited in its objects only to the physical well-
being of the community, but has traditionally concerned itself with the moral 
soundness of its people as well.‖); see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (contending that the majority‘s decision ―effectively decrees the 
end of all morals legislation‖). 
 7. Arguably how a statute is drawn and the substance it regulates are 
not entirely distinguishable; the lines it draws, however abstract in appear-
ance, have substance. 
 8. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575. 
 9. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631–36 (1996) (holding a state con-
stitutional amendment invalidating state action to prohibit discrimination on 
the basis of ―homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or 
relationships‖ violates the Fourteenth Amendment as lacking a rational rela-
tion to a legitimate state purpose and born of animosity to groups). 
 2011] SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY 3 
 
tion, although this has never been said. Recall that using race 
at all in a marriage statute can violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment, ―even assuming an even-handed state purpose to 
protect the ‗integrity‘ of all races.‖10 This is analytically identical 
to the move in Lawrence that reaches out to invalidate the pro-
hibition on anal or oral sex even if evenhandedly drawn against 
heterosexual as well as homosexual participants.11 Except, Lov-
ing v. Virginia did under equality what Lawrence said equality 
could not do.12 The difference is, the substance of the statute 
was recognized in Loving and not in Lawrence. In Loving, a sta-
tute drawn only to prevent intermarriage of ―white person[s]‖ 
with persons of other races was seen as ―obviously an endorse-
ment of the doctrine of White Supremacy.‖13 Given that it is not 
at all obvious whether, why, or how keeping a race ―pure‖ 
makes it supreme, unless one knows that this is how White 
Supremacy fancies itself to work in substance, it is remarkable 
that the substantive understanding extended from White Su-
premacy to the more abstract race per se to invalidate a hypo-
thetical racially symmetrical anti-intermarriage statute. Pre-
sumably keeping all races pure could not keep them all 
supreme.  
What Lawrence missed in this connection is what the rul-
ing is essentially (if mostly tacitly) predicated on: the realiza-
tion that prohibiting same-sex sodomy, and not non-same-sex 
sodomy, is a transparent expression of homophobia, imposing 
an ideology of straight privilege, placing heterosexual over ho-
mosexual in a hierarchy of supremacy. Both cases also substan-
tively contain a stratum of sexuality, hence gender, making 
both at least intersectional cases—Lawrence intersecting sex 
with sexual orientation, Loving intersecting race with sex.14 
Reading Loving in this light, it says a lot about white racism 
that white men put up with other white men telling them who 
 
 10. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 n.11 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 11. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566, 578.  
 12. Which is not to forget that Loving is also a substantive due process 
case. See 388 U.S. at 2–11 (majority opinion). 
 13. Id. at 6–7. 
 14. For an explanation of intersectionality by its originator, see Kimberle 
Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist 
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Poli-
tics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989), and Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the 
Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of 
Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991). For an analysis of the idea‘s further de-
velopment and application, see Elżbieta H. Oleksy, Intesectionality [sic] at the 
Cross-roads, 34 WOMEN‘S STUD. INT‘L F. 263 (2011). 
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they could marry for so long, although of course it constrained 
their sexual and reproductive behavior almost not at all.  
No understanding of White Supremacy has so far overcome 
equal protection‘s formalism in the affirmative action cases, 
where some white people stand not to get what they want ma-
terially, although there is hope.15 But knowing what segrega-
tion substantively meant—that it treated some people as less 
human and lesser citizens than others, relegated some to infe-
riority compared with others, while being an evenhanded sep-
aration on its face, so that it did not even occur to the Supreme 
Court in Brown that being separated ―from others of similar 
age and qualifications solely because of their race‖ might ―gen-
erate[] a feeling of inferiority‖ in the ―hearts and minds‖ of 
white children, who were just as separated from Black children 
as Black children were separated from them—is, I think, what 
Herbert Wechsler objected to in Brown.16 It was the Court‘s 
grasp of substance, finally, that he found so un-lawlike.17 So he 
designed his ―neutral principles‖ of constitutional law18 to 
reinstitutionalize what he saw as ―a point in Plessy‖19 that any 
such substance of hierarchy was not real but an illusion in 
Black people‘s minds, legally unprincipled to cognize. This 
―neutral‖ approach, now a doctrinal term for formal equality, 
has continued, in the guise of principle, to provide the under-
tow, if not the text, of much if not most constitutional adjudica-
tion in the equality area in the United States to the present. 
Despite some real gains, arguably attributable to submerged 
recognitions of substantive inequality like those that animated 
Brown, or more express as in the VMI case,20 this may account 
 
 15. The Court of Appeals panel decision invalidating Proposal 2, which 
struck down the University of Michigan Law School‘s affirmative action proce-
dure previously upheld by the Supreme Court, makes sense when read in this 
light. See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., Nos. 
08–1387, 08–1389, 08–1534, 09–1111, 2011 WL 2600665, at *24 (6th Cir. July 
1, 2011), vacated and en banc hearing granted, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18875, 
at *3–4 (6th Cir. Sept. 9, 2011). 
 16. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1953); Herbert Wech-
sler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 23 
(1959). 
 17. Wechsler, supra note 16. 
 18. Id.  
 19. Id. at 33 (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896)).  
 20. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533–34 (1996) (―‗Inherent dif-
ferences‘ between men and women, we have come to appreciate, remain cause 
for celebration, but not for denigration of the members of either sex or for ar-
tificial constraints on an individual‘s opportunity. Sex classifications may be 
used to compensate women ‗for particular economic disabilities [they have] 
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for the precious little effective headway made by law in elimi-
nating racial inequality from American society for most of the 
people who are harmed by it. 
The empty abstract Aristotelian ―likes alike, unlikes un-
alike‖ test of formal equality can hold A and not A with equal 
logical consistency.21 It can conclude both that a gay marriage 
law does not discriminate against gay men and lesbian women 
based on sex because both men and women equally cannot 
marry persons of their own sex, and that it does discriminate 
against them based on sex because each person who wishes to 
marry a person of their own sex could do so but for their sex.22 
This is more than indeterminate. If abstraction is seldom 
(maybe never) truly empty, here it masquerades as such while 
building in the content of things as they are, which is highly 
determinate: determinately unequal. It is no equality rule at all. 
This problem does not end with lowest tier scrutiny, nor is 
it solved at the highest. The higher one ascends up the tiers of 
scrutiny, going from the merely rational to the more rational to 
the most rational, seeking equality ever more rigorously is 
measured by how much of the regularity of sex can be ignored. 
Put another way, it is shown by how few outliers to a sex-based 
generalization it takes to invalidate a sex-based regularity. The 
meaning given to ―rationality‖ here is ―reflection of existing 
conditions.‖ We know how much we care about sex equality by 
the extent of sex-based distinctions we cannot legally see. It 
makes the sex that is unequal a distinction, not second-class 
status, abstract classifications not substantive classes.  
Reed v. Reed, the constitutional breakthrough, could inval-
idate Idaho‘s sex-based intestate estate administration rules 
because women, substantively, could be presumed relatively 
educated in business matters.23 If all women were kept illiter-
ate, as they often have been, society would have been even 
more in need of sex equality, but the statute would have sur-
vived as rational. Craig v. Boren invalidated a statute that pro-
hibited boys from buying 3.2 beer at the same age as girls be-
 
suffered,‘ to ‗promot[e] equal employment opportunity,‘ to advance full devel-
opment of the talent and capacities of our Nation‘s people. But such classifica-
tions may not be used, as they once were, to create or perpetuate the legal, so-
cial, and economic inferiority of women.‖ (emphasis added) (citations omitted)). 
 21. See MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 4–12. 
 22. Compare, for example, the opinions of Justice Spina and Justice Cordy 
in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 974 (Mass. 
2003) (Spina, J., dissenting); id. at 983 (Cordy, J., dissenting).  
 23. 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971). 
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cause boys got into many more damaging accidents while driv-
ing drunk.24 Because the data showed this substantive differ-
ence, invalidating it meant a greater attention to sex inequali-
ty. But suppose boys were even more dangerous and exclusive 
drivers than they are. Society would be even more sexually ste-
reotyped, but the statute could have met middle tier scrutiny at 
some as yet unspecified point. Frontiero v. Richardson momen-
tarily applied strict scrutiny to sex to invalidate a rule requir-
ing military spouses of women to prove their dependency before 
receiving benefits while paying them automatically to military 
spouses of men.25 Perhaps it would still have been invalidated 
under strict scrutiny if virtually all military spouses were 
women dependent on men, but it would have been even more 
rational, hence more defensible under this doctrine, even 
though the social arrangement that caused it would have been 
more unequal. The point is, because sex is conceived as a dif-
ference, and equality is understood as based on sameness in the 
Aristotelian approach of ―likes alike, unlikes unalike,‖ the 
worse the inequality gets, the more disparate its social reality 
becomes, the less this legal approach can do about it, hence the 
more equal protection doctrine operates to institutionalize it.  
In this approach, if equality already exists, or to the extent 
it is seen to exist—as it did for the few women qualified to be 
admitted to VMI26 or to be made partner at Price Water-
house27—it is rational for law to mirror it; if sex inequality ex-
ists, as it does for most victims of battering or rape28 with im-
punity, it is rational, hence equal, to mirror that as well. Where 
sex inequality is based on an illusion of sex difference, this ap-
proach will work, even well, to counter unequal legal rules. But 
what about all those situations in which the sex inequality is 
real, so the sexes are situated unequally? The more pervasive 
the reality of sex inequality is, the fewer outliers will be per-
mitted in reality, so the more that reality will look like a sex-
based difference, mapping itself onto (the social idea of) sex as 
such, which it will be increasingly rational for law to ignore as 
it ascends the tiers of scrutiny. This approach is perverse even 
 
 24. 429 U.S. 190, 208–10 (1976). 
 25. 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973). This discussion is more fully elaborated in 
MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 235–37. 
 26. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).  
 27. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 232–36 (1989). 
 28. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335–37 (1977) (holding 
a policy sex based because it is based on rapeability as definitive of  
womanhood). 
 2011] SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY 7 
 
before it reaches the capstone of affirmative action, in which it 
is legally possible to act more affirmatively against classifica-
tions that call for less scrutiny, and to act less against those 
that call for more scrutiny. Meaning, the more a classification 
can be scrutinized—that is, the more it is suspected of being 
unequal—the less can legally be done about it. Maybe this 
equality concept is called formal because it is equal in form only.  
Absent a substantive comprehension of inequality, the 
many forms discrimination takes in social life, although no au-
thority so requires, have been compressed into two: facial/direct 
or in-effect/indirect.29 Lacking substance in the foreground, 
some sex-based distinctions are missed even when they are fa-
cial, as was the Lawrence statute‘s prohibition on ―deviate sex-
ual intercourse with another individual of the same sex.‖30 For 
similar reasons, perhaps, others are found to be facially sex-
based when they are not, as was the statute in Michael M. v. 
Superior Court prohibiting ―sexual intercourse accomplished 
with a female not the wife of the perpetrator‖ who is under-
age.31 The disparate impact standard, while partially capturing 
another real part of discrimination‘s effects, which are usually 
disparate in numbers, even statutorily reduces to a nose-
counting exercise.32 This process may indicate by numerical 
skew that discrimination is present but remains devoid of any 
substantive comprehension of what is being counted.  
 
 29. See, e.g., Int‘l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 
n.15 (1977). Teamsters also helpfully notes that these categories are not mu-
tually exclusive in that ―[e]ither theory may, of course, be applied to a particu-
lar set of facts.‖ Id. 
 30. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (2003) (emphasis added). For fur-
ther consideration of Lawrence through a sex equality lens, see Catharine A. 
MacKinnon, The Road Not Taken: Sex Equality in Lawrence v. Texas, 65 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1081 (2004). 
 31. 450 U.S. 464, 466 (1981). The Court puzzlingly concluded from this 
that ―[t]he statute thus makes men alone criminally liable for the act of sexual 
intercourse.‖ Id. There being no test for what is ―facial‖ in the entire corpus of 
sex equality law does not help.  
 32. Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, exactly how disparate an im-
pact must be to be deemed discriminatory remains an unclear matter of count-
ing, although the EEOC Uniform Guideline has attempted to resolve this with 
its eighty percent rule. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(d) (2010); see also EEOC v. War-
shawsky & Co., 768 F. Supp. 647, 654–55 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (applying the eighty 
percent rule). 
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The intent requirement in disparate impact cases,33 apart 
from being usually impossible to prove, may be seen as an at-
tempt to fill the void at the center of the existing concept of 
equal protection, occupying the space or force of deus ex machi-
na where the real substance of inequality would be seen as the 
driver if it was seen at all. Intent, variously called also motive, 
purpose, or animus, although the Supreme Court has never 
said why on principle it is required in constitutional discrimi-
nation cases, fills an apparent psychological need in some for a 
substantive wrongness and impelling force that treating less 
well a substantial disproportion of people of one group, or a 
single person because of their group membership, seems inex-
plicably to lack. The reason for this lack is a failure to see the 
substance of inequality that particular cases present. Intent al-
so entrenches in doctrine the assumption that the social world 
is equal other than in a few exceptional situations in which bad 
apple individuals set out to make it otherwise on purpose. In-
tent as a requirement supplies a veneer of moral negativity to 
acts that, although disparate, are otherwise not seen as un-
equal on a group basis. This would not be needed if the tilt of 
white privilege or male dominance, historic and extending into 
the present—the barrel problem of substance—was identified. 
Both facial and impact discrimination are real, in other 
words, but neither is the only measure of discrimination and 
hardly exhausts its reality. Systemic discrimination results in 
jobs that mainly women do being paid less than jobs that main-
ly men do, yet comparable worth claims are not recognized in 
the United States.34 Sexual harassment is recognized as gend-
er-based in substance but is not necessarily either facial or im-
pact in form. Although it is generally statutorily treated as 
akin to disparate treatment, proof of motive in the usual sense 
is not generally required. Sexual harassment can be discrimi-
natorily gender-based even if it happens to only one woman. 
And structural bias against women‘s needs is embedded 
throughout the legal system, for example in the public/private 
distinction, which underlies family law among others, yet nei-
ther that structural feature nor that area of law is legally seen 
 
 33. Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 
271–81 (1979) makes the intent requirement explicit in sex cases, as Washing-
ton v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238–48 (1976) does in race cases. 
 34. See Cnty. of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 180–81 (1981); AFSCME 
v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1408 (9th Cir. 1985); Christensen v. Iowa, 563 
F.2d 353, 355–56 (8th Cir. 1977); Lemons v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 17 Fair 
Empl. Prac. Cas. 906, 910 (D. Colo. 1978), aff ’d, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir. 1980). 
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as gender-based.35 Lacking a substantive grasp of the role of 
reproduction in sex inequality, the Supreme Court has found 
that discrimination against pregnant people is not discrimina-
tion based on sex,36 although Congress has taken the opposite 
view in some areas within its power.37 But for constitutional 
purposes, a pregnant woman still is not regarded as a woman 
in the sense of being a member of a sex-based class when she is 
discriminated against because of her pregnancy.38 None of 
these examples is especially indirect although they are not 
what is regarded as direct either. All are forms of discrimina-
tion de facto, the closest American law comes to recognizing the 
larger reality context of discrimination, which it simply opposes 
to de jure discrimination that is legally created, and is accord-
ingly considered beyond the reach of constitutional law even 
when law is deeply implicated.  
Sub rosa, the substance of the facts of cases animated by 
substantive inequality do affect the doctrinal moves on the sur-
face. But typically those realities can be invoked by litigants, if 
at all, by inference or trick mirrors, because the terms and tests 
on which the determination of whether a statute or practice is 
equal has been kept as far away as possible from open engage-
ment with them. Nothing is openly allowed to turn on reality. 
Litigating an equality case for a plaintiff, as a result, often re-
volves around efforts to shoehorn the facts and context before 
the court into a doctrinal straightjacket that is dead set on 
making the outcome turn on anything but. Supporting this ar-
rangement is the shibboleth that, with equality, there can be no 
agreement on substance, but people can come together on emp-
ty abstractions. This is just another way entrenched power—
the perspective from the top of the inequality hierarchy—
controls the real and how it is seen and authoritatively con-
tended with. With litigants precluded from talking openly 
about substance, whatever anyone cares about emerges, often 
 
 35. The latter is made structurally vivid in DeShaney v. Winnebago Coun-
ty Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 201–03 (1989) (holding state 
agency not responsible for severe beating of child. ―While the State may have 
been aware of the dangers that Joshua faced in the free world, it played no 
part in their creation . . . .‖); and Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316–18 (1980) 
(rendering abortion right structurally private in that deprivation of public 
funding for it is not unconstitutional). 
 36. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494–97 (1974). 
 37. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2010). 
 38. See, e.g., Bray v. Alexandria Women‘s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 
269–77 (1993). 
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in pretzeled form, in those hypotheticals that increasingly dom-
inate Supreme Court arguments, frequently overwhelming the 
people and situations directly at stake.  
Equality is substantive in Canada. Unimaginably, life and 
law do go on, often animated by a greater spirit of live-and-let-
live than slightly further south. Equality began to be under-
stood as substantive in Canada in 1989 in Andrews v. Law So-
ciety of British Columbia, which repudiated the Aristotelian 
―likes alike, unlikes unalike‖ approach for the first time in his-
tory and replaced it with a substantive test of historical disad-
vantage on enumerated and akin concrete grounds.39 The ac-
tual substance of each inequality is to construct the law of that 
ground. Substantive inequality follows the substance of the in-
equality in question, so the first issue is whether the legally 
challenged inequality is part of the socially prior inequality. 
Tellingly, Canadian equality law has no intent requirement be-
cause most inequality is not, in reality, intentional and because 
its doctrine, having no empty center to fill, does not need it.40 
Losing its way for a time in tests that arguably performed ab-
straction in the name of substance,41 the Supreme Court of 
Canada in 2008 openly returned to Andrews.42  
The Canadian example illustrates that when courts fail to 
grasp the nettle of hierarchy, they cast about, at sea for a way 
to express what is unequal about inequality. A substantive ap-
proach, no silver bullet just because it is called that, can also 
fail to hit the target. The substance of inequality is, obviously, 
open to discussion. Ontario v. M&H43 inaugurated the current 
fervor for dignity as the test for equality. The material inequa-
lities attendant to non-recognition of same-sex partners as 
spouses apparently was not enough. (Further off the mark was 
Mr. Justice Gonthier‘s dissent, substantive though it was, miss-
ing the gay/straight hierarchy altogether.)44 Deprivation of dig-
nity is often a powerful dimension of the substance of inequali-
ty and does some of its work. It is just not all there is to it, or 
even its irreducible core, sine qua non, or floor, especially in the 
 
 39. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (Can.). 
 40. See id. at 172–75. 
 41. An example is the test in Law v. Canada, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, 523–24 
(Can.).  
 42. See R. v. Kapp, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 483, 501–08 ¶¶ 14–30 (Can.). 
 43. [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 (Can.). 
 44. Id. at 19 (Gonthier, J., dissenting). 
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one Kantian conception of dignity45 that implicitly dominates 
its legal applications.46 Not being used for another‘s ends would 
help women in some respects. It certainly condemns prostitu-
tion, for example, although dignity‘s adherents do not generally 
seem to notice. Yet many women dedicate themselves to being 
instruments to the ends of others with whom they are in rela-
tion, such as their children, as do many people of both sexes 
who understand the purpose of their lives in communal terms 
to give them dignity rather than sacrifice it. Dignity is also no-
toriously susceptible to culturally gender-based differences that 
cannot be decoded without a grasp of substantive inequality. If 
inequality were understood in terms of its specific hierarchical 
substance, which is virtually always material as well as digni-
tary, all this would be evident, and inequality‘s material di-
mensions would not be covered up. Courts can also adopt a 
substantive equality approach without saying so, as the Su-
preme Court of Canada has repeatedly done,47 with benefits in 
particular cases but without fully unlocking the transformative 
potential of a substantive equality jurisprudence. 
A substantive equality approach, as the foregoing discus-
sion implies, does not fully fit into any mainstream equality 
doctrine and changes not only the outcomes of discrimination 
cases but, as importantly if not more so, alters the circums-
tances that are identified as giving rise to equality questions in 
the first place. It begins by asking, what is the substance of this 
particular inequality, and are these facts an instance of that 
substance? Its core insight is that inequality, substantively 
speaking, is always a social relation of rank ordering, typically 
on a group or categorical basis—higher and lower, more and 
less, top and bottom, better and worse, clean and dirty, served 
and serving, appropriately rich and appropriately poor, supe-
rior and inferior, dominant and subordinate, justly forceful and 
rightly violated or victimized, commanding and obeying—that 
precedes the legal one.48 It is actualized concretely in specific 
domains for each inequality, often intersecting and overlap-
ping. What is wrong with unequal treatment in this approach 
 
 45. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 
39–41 (James W. Ellington trans., Hackett Publishing Co. 3d ed. 1993) (1785). 
 46. An interesting examination of its vicissitudes can be found in Christo-
pher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human 
Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT‘L L. 655 (2008). 
 47. One pertinent example in the present context is R. v. Lavallee, [1990] 
1 S.C.R. 852, 871–89 (Can.). 
 48. See R. v. Turpin, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296, 1330–34 (Can.). 
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is that it is harmfully predicated on a ranking of one‘s group 
that positions some as inferior to others when they are not—for 
example, based on their group membership, as the appropriate 
targets of violence or violation, or as inappropriate to be paid as 
much as others. It is thus fundamentally factually false. When 
a society decides that a particular ground is a prohibited basis 
for discrimination, the question whether the group(s) defined 
by that ground are appropriately placed in caste-like arrange-
ments, some being treated and considered better than others, is 
no longer open for discussion. It is this that the United States 
Supreme Court‘s approach to equal protection on the basis of 
sex has yet to squarely resolve. The resulting material and dig-
nitary deprivations and violations are substantive indications 
and consequences of this hierarchy, but it is the hierarchy itself 
that defines the core inequality problem.  
The essence of inequality is the misanthropic notion—
misogynist in the case of women—that some are intrinsically 
more worthy than others, hence justly belong elevated over 
them, because of the group of which they are (or are perceived 
to be) a member. The substance of each inequality, hence the 
domain in which it operates as a hierarchy, is distinctive to 
each one, but it is hierarchy that makes it an inequality. The 
point here is, equality is only secondarily a value, and it is not 
basically a matter of morality, meaning judgments of right and 
wrong. Primarily, it is a fact. People are human equals,49 mean-
ing falsely rendered inferior or superior in society or by the 
state by group assignment. Obviously, this has nothing what-
ever to do with the human universality of difference, since no 
group difference makes one social group another group‘s infe-
rior or superior. Everything makes everyone different from ev-
eryone else, but no group characteristic makes everyone in one 
social group more or less valuable than everyone in another 
group.50 Inequality is, accordingly, a fact as well, and it is find-
ing facts that courts are for. 
Gender is the unequal social system attributed to sex, the 
central myth of which is that gender hierarchy is natural. Sex, 
in reality, is an equality, the sexes being equally similar or 
equally different as well as equally human. It is gender, the so-
 
 49. Aristotle neither believed nor said this or anything of the sort.  
 50. Here, I am talking about real social groups, such as African Ameri-
cans, Hispanic women, children, or the disabled, not phony groupings that 
could be invented for abstract purposes such as ―all people who are not quali-
fied for this job‖ or ―everyone who cannot lift more than 30 lbs.‖ 
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cial reality of sex, that makes men and women, the beings as-
signed a sex and ascribed gender accordingly, into unequals in 
a hierarchy relative to one another. Gender hierarchy is the 
transnational social system of masculinity over femininity that 
becomes men over women predicated on the lie of male supe-
riority and female inferiority. Inherently, equality is relational 
and comparative. Under gender hierarchy, women in this sense 
are not what the standard equality approach imagines them to 
be: a demographic with shared biological features. Women are 
a social group formed by gender inequality in all of its substan-
tive domains, which are sexual and economic, among others.  
The inequalities that affect the group women are often re-
vealed by disparity in numbers compared with men, but the 
range and depth, hence reality, of the inequality is not ex-
hausted by head-counting, which is why substantive equality 
cannot be fully expressed by the doctrine of disparate impact or 
discrimination in effect, although that is as close as the main-
stream United States‘ approach gets to it. The substance of 
substantive inequality can be visited on a single person, so long 
as it is grounded in the concrete historical discriminatory social 
reality of group membership. Presuming equality of entitle-
ment without requiring sameness of traits, the substantive 
question centers on dimensions for comparison: What is the 
substance of each inequality, such that each plaintiff is or is not 
an example of it? In this approach, equality remains concretely 
comparative and operates on material rather than ideational 
ground. And since failure to act is as substantively potent as 
acting, there is no distinction between negative and positive 
rights.  
Gender hierarchy, ―[w]hether from overt discrimination or 
from the socialization process of a male-dominated culture,‖51 
litters the United States legal system in instances frequently 
unrecognized by a law fixated on ―sex classifications.‖52 The 
systemic failure to protect women in their homes from violence 
by men with whom they are close is a prime example. Discrim-
ination in this form does not look the way the law expects sex 
classifications, modeled on racial classifications, to look. It has 
its own shape, often the shape of absence. Absent are laws that 
address these crimes of misogyny as they actually happen. Ab-
 
 51. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 353 (1974).  
 52. The constitutional sex equality doctrine addresses sex classifications 
virtually exclusively in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Frontiero v. Richard-
son, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); and Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).  
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sent is enforcement of laws that do exist that might help. Ab-
sent are legal standards that find any of these absences illegal. 
Absence of accountability for violence against women is so reli-
able it has become the presence of impunity. As one instance, 
faced with the need to establish a liability standard for schools 
for sexual harassment under Title IX, the Supreme Court 
adopted the due process test of ―deliberate indifference,‖53 
which is not only low, and has not only virtually eliminated in-
stitutional liability for sexual harassment in education, but has 
nothing to do with equality and everything to do with proce-
dural due process: how the institution proceeds, not what it 
does. It says it all about the vacuity of equal protection, its fail-
ure to grasp the substance of gender inequality, that Town of 
Castle Rock v. Gonzales54—a situation of domestic violence in 
which a father murdered his three daughters, violating a 
―mandatory‖ order of protection even to have them with him, 
despite their mother‘s allegedly numerous frantic calls to the 
unresponsive police—was, no doubt for strategic reasons, 
brought as a due process property case.55 
The contrast between formal and substantive equality as 
standards can be further illustrated by considering the law of 
prostitution. To decide whether prostitution law is sex discri-
minatory, formal equality asks whether it treats men and 
women the same.56 Typically, on the level of prostituted people, 
it does, because whoever is being sold as sex is treated accord-
ing to the female standard without regard to sex, like whoever 
begs for bread under bridges is treated the same. The nose-
counting disparate impact test would show a dramatic dispari-
ty in numbers, though, given that many more women are sold 
for sex. This indicates something. But it would not be disposi-
tive of inequality in the standard approach, which looks for in-
 
 53. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290, 292–93 
(1998); see also Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999). 
 54. 545 U.S. 748, 751–55 (2005). 
 55. Jessica Gonzales, the mother, complained to the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States under 
the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, of ―a widespread, 
systemic, and longstanding practice of treating domestic violence as a less se-
rious crime than other crimes and marginalizing domestic violence victims on 
the basis of their gender.‖ Final Observations Regarding the Merits of the 
Case at 149, Gonzales v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm‘n H.R., 
Report No. 80/11 (2011), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/casos/11.eng.htm. 
 56. See People v. Hartway, 562 P.2d 1315, 1319–20 (Cal. 1977); State v. 
Jordan 2002 (6) SA 642 (CC) at para. 73 (S. Afr.) (O‘Regan, J. and Sachs, J., 
dissenting), available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2002/22.pdf.  
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tent, or necessarily in the substantive approach either, which 
looks for pre-existing hierarchy. In the mainstream approach, 
the fact that most pimps are men would legally be treated the 
same as the fact that most prostituted people are women, the 
gendered hierarchy between the two being invisible and irrele-
vant, the symmetrical facts even providing evidence of lack of 
sex discrimination in the law.  
Within the conventional formal framework, prostitution 
does not pose issues of sex discrimination unless a law is facial-
ly sex-based or its application is intentionally invidious. From a 
substantive perspective, the social institution of prostitution—
selling people for sex—is a gendered activity that is fundamen-
tal to male dominance. It treats people, most of whom are 
women, all of whom are feminized, as objects for sexual use, 
making them into social inferiors, stigmatizing them as human 
dirt, while the laws against pimping are largely unenforced and 
the laws against buying, an activity usually engaged in by men, 
always masculine, are largely nonexistent. The absence of ef-
fective laws and law enforcement against those who, in sub-
stance, exploit people in prostitution is substantive sex discrim-
ination, as is the typical law enforcement pattern of 
criminalizing prostituted people. A substantive sex equality 
approach, accordingly, would decriminalize people sold in pros-
titution and strongly criminalize those who buy and sell 
them.57 Almost all those who would be prosecuted under such a 
scheme, as with rape laws, would predictably be men, either as 
sellers or buyers of others, a substantively male dominant be-
havior. Anyone bought or sold for sex would not be prosecuted, 
due to being substantively in a female/subordinate position, re-
gardless of their sex.  
If equality was substantively understood in the United 
States, the recent Third Circuit case of Reedy v. Evanson58 
would be such a case. The plaintiff, Sara Reedy, was raped by a 
robber of the convenience store where she worked.59 Shortly af-
ter reporting the rape, she was arrested by Detective Frank 
Evanson for allegedly robbing her employer and falsely report-
ing the rape to cover it up.60 After the perpetrator later admit-
 
 57. For further analysis of the Swedish model, predicated on this analysis, 
see Catharine A. MacKinnon, Trafficking, Prostitution, and Inequality, 46 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 271, 301–04 (2011). 
 58. 615 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1571 (2011). 
 59. Id. at 202. 
 60. Id. 
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ted both her rape and the robbery, subsequent to being arrested 
for a similar crime in the vicinity, Reedy sued Evanson for a 
range of violations, not including sex discrimination,61 despite 
the misogyny written all over his attitudes and behavior. The 
amicus brief for Reedy by many groups,62 had it been a legal 
argument rather than a policy brief, could have marshaled its 
strong evidence and cogent analysis to argue that Evanson 
used his official position to deprive Reedy of equal protection of 
the laws on the basis of her sex by disbelieving her report of 
rape, following standard rape myths typical of rape-prone socie-
ties, and falsely accusing her of theft because she was a woman 
accusing a man of sexual assault. She neither received the pro-
tection of the law of rape as a shield nor was she protected from 
the false prosecution that used state power against her as a 
sword. These are among the reasons that most rapes are not 
reported. As it was, she won primarily on her claim that ana-
lyzing her blood, drawn for the rape kit not the other purpose 
for which it was also used, violated her expectation, hence 
right, of privacy.63 The only mention of equality in the brief is 
in some of the groups‘ descriptions of their missions.64  
If much of the most vicious substance of sex inequality, 
taken on its own terms rather than calling it anything else or 
pursuing it by analogy to something else, has gone missing in 
U.S. law—even if no authority has denied that violence against 
women is sex discriminatory, and the U.S. Congress once 
adopted this theory65—the international order has found it. 
Over the last two decades or so, attention to crimes committed 
against women in peace and war under international humani-
tarian and criminal law principles has combined with muscular 
pursuit of violence against women as a violation of human 
rights to produce the converged concept of ―gender crime.‖ In a 
dual motion, United Nations treaty bodies and regional legal 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. Brief Amici Curiae of Thirty-Nine Organizations Dedicated to Improv-
ing the Criminal Justice System‘s Response to Violence Against Women in 
Support of Appellant and Requesting Reversal, Reedy, 615 F.3d 197 (No. 09-
2210) [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae]. 
 63. Reedy, 615 F.3d at 230.  
 64. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 62, at 26, 28–30, 36–37. 
 65. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 103-711, at 152 (1994) (Conf. Rep.); S. REP. 
NO. 102-197, at 42 (1991). The case that invalidated the civil remedy afforded 
by the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) did so for impermissible use of 
the federal legislative power—wrongly in my view—but did not question that 
violence against women may be properly cognized as sex discrimination. Unit-
ed States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–20 (2000). 
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systems, with governments as defendants, began to recognize 
violence against women as gender-based and sex discriminato-
ry when tolerated, although the acts were crimes, at the same 
time international criminal justice entities came to see prose-
cuting individual perpetrators of the same crimes as a tool for 
protecting the human rights of their victims.  
In the largest single step in this direction, the CEDAW 
Committee in 1992 interpreted the prohibition on discrimina-
tion against women in the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women to include ―gender-
based violence, that is, violence that is directed against a wom-
an because she is a woman or that affects women dispropor-
tionately.‖66 Over the following decade, international criminal 
prosecutions came to be seen as an instrument for vindicating 
human rights on the basis of gender. The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court represents the apex articulation 
of the concept to date, recognizing gender crimes as crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, and acts of genocide.67 The Lat-
in American regional system, under the most substantive hu-
 
 66. Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women, 11th sess, Jan. 20–30, 1992, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. A/47/38; GAOR, 47th 
Sess., Supp. No. 38 (1993); see also Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women, 32d–33d sess, Jan. 10–28, 2005, July 5–22, 
2005, at 80–92, U.N. Doc. A/60/38; GAOR, 60th Sess., Supp. No. 38, Annex III 
(2005) (finding Hungary responsible for sex-discriminatory treatment of bat-
tered woman under Optional Protocol). CEDAW‘s original approach, if broad-
gauged socially, economically, and culturally, was largely formal and conven-
tional so far as equality itself was concerned and did not include violence 
against women. 
 67. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7, ¶ 1(g), 
July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 (defining ―crime against humanity‖ to include 
―[r]ape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced steri-
lization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity‖); id. art. 7, 
¶ 1(h) (recognizing persecution based on gender as a ―crime against humani-
ty‖); id. art. 8, ¶ 2(b)(xxii) (defining ―war crimes‖ perpetrated during interna-
tional armed conflicts to include ―rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, 
forced pregnancy, as defined in article 7, paragraph 2(f ), enforced sterilization, 
or any other form of sexual violence also constituting a grave breach of the 
Geneva Conventions‖); id. art. 8, ¶ 2(e)(vi) (extending definition to encompass 
non-international armed conflicts); id. art. 6(b) (defining ―genocide‖ to include 
―[c]ausing serious bodily or mental harm to members of [a] group,‖ which has 
been interpreted to apply to sexual atrocities in genocides). Almost all the first 
cases prosecuted include gender crimes in some form. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. 
Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 
¶¶ 339–54 (Sept. 30, 2008), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/ 
doc571253.pdf. 
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man rights convention in the world on the subject,68 requires 
that member states reduce domestic violence and stop condon-
ing it, including through effective police and judicial action.69  
In its most instructive and farthest-reaching decision in 
the area, the European Court of Human Rights found Turkey 
substantively responsible for the murder of a woman by her 
daughter‘s husband, whose violence and threats had been re-
peatedly reported to them, under the European Convention on 
Human Rights,70 violating the complainants‘ rights to equal 
protection of the laws on the basis of sex. ―Bearing in mind its 
finding [that] . . . discriminatory judicial passivity in Turkey, 
albeit unintentional, mainly affected women,‖ the Court said, 
―the violence suffered by the applicant and her mother may be 
regarded as gender-based violence which is a form of discrimi-
nation against women.‖71 Moreover, the ―overall unresponsive-
ness of the judicial system and impunity enjoyed by the aggres-
sors . . . indicated that there was insufficient commitment to 
take appropriate action to address domestic violence.‖72 The 
view that discrimination need not be intentional to be discrimi-
natory was essential to this finding both as a practical matter 
and (on present moral terrain) perhaps as a face-saving me-
chanism for men holding other men accountable for what still 
other men do to women. The same virtually routine collabora-
tion of law enforcement with batterers continues in the United 
States into the present in ―a lengthy and tragic history‖ that 
the Bakke plurality said gender under law was not perceived to 
have.73 
 
 68. Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Era-
dication of Violence Against Women, June 9, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1534, available at 
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/a-61.html. 
 69. See Fernandes v. Brazil, Case 12.051, Inter-Am. Comm‘n H.R., Report 
No. 54/01 (2001), available at http://cidh.org/annualrep/2000eng/ChapterIII/ 
Merits/Brazil12.051.htm. 
 70. Opuz v. Turkey, App. No. 33401/02 ¶ 153 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 9, 2009), 
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm& 
action=html&highlight=33401/02&sessionid=81975731&skin=hudoc-en. 
 71. Id. ¶ 200. Europe is embarking on further advances in this area. See, 
e.g., Eur. Consult. Ass., Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Com-
bating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence, 121st Sess. (2011), 
available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/HTML/Domestic 
Violence.htm. 
 72. Opuz, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 200. 
 73. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 303 (1978) (Pow-
ell, J., plurality opinion). 
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Aside from certain features of the existing U.S. constitu-
tional approach that palpably fall short by a substantive sex 
equality measure—in this pantheon, the intent requirement74 
and the scope of the federal legislative power75 stand out—case 
after case decided under doctrines wholly other than sex equal-
ity have gendered dimensions at their core that pass completely 
unnoticed to women‘s systematic detriment. The recent line of 
cases on the Confrontation Clause provides an example.76 
These cases tacitly presume that the people confronted in court 
are the social equals of the people who confront them, as if no 
extrinsic social power systematically situates one over the oth-
er. Many of the Confrontation Clause cases involve domestic 
battering, one of the most common crimes in the United 
States,77 with women the most frequent victim of men with 
 
 74. Pers. Adm‘r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979). 
 75. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (invalidating the 
Violence Against Women Act, which provided a federal civil remedy for the 
victims of gender-motivated violence, as exceeding Congress‘s legislative pow-
er). But cf. Nev. Dep‘t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 737 (2003) (per-
mitting Family and Medical Leave Act as federal prophylactic legislation 
against sex discrimination at the work-family interface). 
 76. These cases are discussed subsequently, see infra text accompanying 
notes 82–85, 89–90. 
 77. The FBI Uniform Crime Reports 2010 lists aggravated assault as the 
most common violent crime in the United States, likely to be committed every 
40.5 seconds. Uniform Crime Reports: National Data, THE FED. BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime 
-in-the-u.s.-2010/offenses-known-to-law-enforcement/standard-links/national-data 
( last visited Nov. 3, 2011); see also JULIE L. GERBERDING ET AL., DEP‘T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., COSTS OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 1–2 (2003), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ 
ncipc/pub-res/ipv_cost/ipvbook-final-feb18.pdf; NAT‘L CTR. FOR INJURY PRE-
VENTION AND CONTROL, UNDERSTANDING INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: FACT 
SHEET (2011) (applying PATRICA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP‘T OF 
JUSTICE, EXTENT, NATURE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER VI-
OLENCE (2000), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/181867 
.pdf  (providing findings from the National Violence Against Women Survey)), 
available at http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/ipv_factsheet-a.pdf (stat-
ing that each year women experience about 4.8 million intimate partner re-
lated physical assaults); JENNIFER L. TRUMAN, U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, CRIMI-
NAL VICTIMIZATION 2010 at 9–10 (2011), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 
content/pub/pdf/cv10.pdf (indicating intimate partner violence makes up 22% 
of violent crimes committed against women); Antonia C. Novello et al., From 
the Surgeon General, US Public Health Service, J. AM. MED. ASS‘N 3132, 3132 
(1992) (reporting domestic violence the leading cause of injuries to women ages 
fifteen through forty-four); Uniform Crime Reports: Expanded Homicide Data 
Table 10, THE FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about 
-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/tables/10shrtbl10.xls. 
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whom they are acquainted (often well).78 Battered women try to 
avoid testifying against their batterers because of sex inequali-
ty: terror for their lives and security and that of their children 
and animals; fear of loss of economic support in the absence of 
viable economic options of their own because they are women; 
depression or PTSD due to long-term gender-based abuse; a 
well-founded belief that the criminal justice system will not be-
lieve them because they are women and will believe him be-
cause he is a man. Battering men manipulate and threaten 
their victims to keep them from testifying against them, includ-
ing with promises to change. Often these men are the fathers of 
the women‘s children; the women want to believe them and fre-
quently continue to love them, a dynamic difficult to separate 
from the self-annihilation of traumatic bonding. Domestic bat-
tering, in other words, is a gender crime, a cornerstone of male 
dominance as a substantive system. Is it any surprise to learn 
that between eighty and ninety percent of all women who re-
port being battered in the United States do not cooperate with 
prosecution?79 Their abuser has more power in their lives than 
their government does. 
Battered women‘s relation to the legal system has been ex-
tensively studied in a variety of procedural postures. Studies of 
mediation in divorce tellingly show that, when battering enters 
the picture, women are in no position to face men as equals in a 
legal setting, even when formally on the same plane, 
represented by counsel.80 For example, we do not know if Craw-
ford battered his wife; we do know that she saw him kill a man 
said to have raped her, after which she hid behind spousal im-
munity to avoid testifying against him81—perhaps out of loyal-
ty, perhaps out of fear. Her testimony was found inadmissible 
as testimonial hearsay, since he could not confront her in 
court.82  
 
 78. That intimate relationships are gendered regardless of sex only ex-
pands the point. 
 79. Tom Lininger, Reconceptualizing Confrontation After Davis, 85 TEX. L. 
REV. 271, 281 n.70 (2006) (citing People v. Brown, 94 P.3d 574, 576 (Cal. 
2004); Douglas E. Beloof & Joel Shapiro, Let the Truth Be Told: Proposed 
Hearsay Exceptions to Admit Domestic Violence Victims’ out of Court State-
ments as Substantive Evidence, 11 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 3 (2002); Lisa 
Marie De Sanctis, Bridging the Gap Between the Rules of Evidence and Justice 
for Victims of Domestic Violence, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 359, 367 (1996)). 
 80. See, e.g., Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and 
the Politics of Power, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 441, 516 (1992). 
 81. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 39–40, 68 (2004). 
 82. Id. 
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The Supreme Court cases that followed Crawford involved 
domestic violence expressly. In Davis, a woman‘s 911 call was 
found non-testimonial hearsay, hence admissible.83 In its com-
panion case, Hammon, the woman‘s affidavit was taken by po-
lice within minutes of reporting her husband‘s battering, as he 
was being occupied by another police officer in the next room.84 
Her affidavit was considered testimonial rather than address-
ing an ongoing emergency. The battered woman who has 
(usually temporarily) escaped from a gun at home is less likely 
to be able to present her reality to a court without risking her 
life further because her statements will be less construable as 
part of an ongoing emergency. The extent to which the life of a 
battered woman is something of an ongoing emergency—it was 
through taking the affidavit in question that the officer learned 
Herschel Hammon had just then stopped assaulting Amy85—
was not seen.  
It is when taking decisive and powerful steps against their 
batterers, which testifying in court certainly represents, that 
battered women‘s lives become most unsafe.86 The whole point 
of ―evidence-based prosecution‖ has been to keep batterers from 
getting off the hook by further manipulating and coercing their 
victims.87 Lininger is rightly apprehensive that the require-
ment of live testimony by accusers produced by the Crawford 
line ―may tempt defendants to intimidate or even kill their vic-
tims before trial because the unavailability of the victim may 
foreclose any possibility of prosecution.‖88 Amici pointed this 
 
 83. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 828 (2006). 
 84. Id. at 819–20. 
 85. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respon-
dent at 15, Davis, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (No. 05-5705) (discussing the facts of 
Hammon v. Indiana, which was consolidated with Davis at the Supreme 
Court). This brief rightly sees Hammon as emergency questioning. 
 86. See JAMES PTACEK, BATTERED WOMEN IN THE COURTROOM: THE 
POWER OF JUDICIAL RESPONSES 84–85 (1999) (discussing danger of batterer 
retaliation in response to victims‘ attempts to secure legal protection); Lenore 
E.A. Walker et al., Risk Assessment and Lethal Potential, in THE BATTERED 
WOMAN SYNDROME 107, 107–08 (3d ed. 2009) (pointing to general consensus 
that battered women are most vulnerable to retaliation ―from the point of sep-
aration to about two years afterwards‖). 
 87. See Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. 
REV. 747, 751–52 (2005). The National Network to End Domestic Violence and 
others documented this response and the need for it well without making the 
equality argument. See Brief of Amici Curiae the National Network to End 
Domestic Violence et al. in Support of Respondents at 14–15, Davis v. Wash-
ington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (No. 05-5224) [hereinafter Davis Amici Brief ].  
 88. Lininger, supra note 79, at 284–85. 
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out to the Court with no sex equality analysis.89 Forfeiture of 
the right of confrontation when the defendant makes the decla-
rant unavailable could help the prosecution but may prove im-
possible to use if the same sex inequalities preclude access to 
the evidence needed to establish it.  
Gendered realities could be incorporated into constitutional 
assessments through myriad technical routes if the substantive 
regularities of gender inequality were visible and regarded as 
relevant, resulting in women being full citizens. In the absence 
of an explicit sex equality guarantee, in the vacuum of women‘s 
voices and concerns in constitutional history, Crawford relies 
upon common law and the views of the framers from a period 
when women were tantamount to chattel and were permitted 
no public voice.90 This latest interpretation of the Confrontation 
Clause, with predictably disastrous implications for security 
and justice for battered women, even has a disproportionate 
impact on women in a fairly conventional sense: neutral on its 
face but systematically disadvantaging one sex, in this case the 
sex that is disempowered through the acts for which the State 
is seeking criminal redress, against a backdrop of centuries of 
neglect. It is women, battered by male intimates in dramatical-
ly differential numbers,91 who, based on gender, are not effec-
tively protected by state laws that effectively exempt from legal 
 
 89. See Davis Amici Brief, supra note 87, at 19–20; Brief for the United 
States as Amicus Curiae at 19 n.10, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 
(2004) (No. 02-9410). 
 90. See Davis Amici Brief, supra note 87, at 7–9 (arguing the legal system 
has historically failed to substantively address domestic violence). The ACLU, 
purporting to take both sides of the case seriously, sided with the defendant in 
both Davis and Hammon. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Li-
berties Union et al. in Support of Petitioners at 5, Davis, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) 
(No. 05-5224) (arguing ―[a] strategy to address domestic violence cannot be 
premised on an end run around the Constitution‖). 
 91. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, approximately eighty-
five percent of victims of intimate partner violence in 2001 were female. CAL-
LIE MARIE RENNISON, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, 1993–2001, at 1 (2003), 
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ipv01.pdf. Similarly, the 
Senate Judiciary Committee reported that women were six times as likely as 
men to be victims of intimate partner violence. MAJORITY STAFF OF SENATE 
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 102D CONG., VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: A WEEK 
IN THE LIFE OF AMERICA 2 (Comm. Print 1992); see also WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
WORLD REPORT ON VIOLENCE AND HEALTH 93 (Etienne G. Krug et al. eds., 
2002), available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2002/9241545615_eng 
.pdf (―Studies from Australia, Canada, Israel, South Africa and the United 
States of America show that 40–70% of female murder victims were killed by 
their husbands or boyfriends, frequently in the context of an ongoing abusive 
relationship . . . .‖). 
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accountability those who exercise violent power over them. Le-
gal questions arising because of the unequal status of women, a 
matter few were thinking about at the founding or even after 
John Stuart Mill‘s illuminating analysis of ―ill usage‖ in 1869,92 
are resolved as if women do not exist. But Sir Walter Raleigh 
still lives in their minds.93 
The subsequent Supreme Court case of Michigan v. Bryant 
allowed that the emergency may be ongoing because it ―extends 
beyond an initial victim to a potential threat to the responding 
police and the public . . . .‖94 This offers hope for battered wom-
en only because (and to the degree) it looks to the danger the 
batterer poses to people other than her. When the Supreme 
Court in 1992 found unconstitutional a statute that required 
wives to notify their husbands of plans to abort because it em-
powered the husband with a ―troubling degree of authority over 
his wife,‖ this was supported by evidence that many women are 
assaulted by their male partners, even though the sex inequali-
ty was not legally framed as such.95 In the recent Confrontation 
Clause cases, instead of preventing the state from lining up be-
hind the battering man, as the Casey plurality did, the hand of 
the batterer is strengthened by the hand of the Court. 
If the home is the most dangerous place for women, a usa-
ble firearm makes it even more so.96 Further ignoring battered 
 
 92. JOHN STUART MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN 25–26, 59 (Transac-
tion Publishers 2001) (1869). Not having the empirical evidence we have to-
day, he hopefully concluded, ―[i]f married life were all that it might be ex-
pected to be, looking to the laws alone, society would be a hell upon earth.‖ Id. 
at 60. 
 93. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44 (2004) (pointing to the injustice resulting 
from the conviction and execution of Sir Walter Raleigh on the basis of the tes-
timony of a man whom Raleigh was not permitted to confront). 
 94. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1156 (2011). 
 95. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 898 (1992) (plu-
rality opinion). 
 96. Some sources documenting this uncontroversial reality include: Wen-
dy Cukier & James Cairns, Gender, Attitudes and the Regulation of Small 
Arms: Implications for Action, in SEXED PISTOLS: THE GENDERED IMPACTS OF 
SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS 18, 21–24 (Vanessa Farr et al. eds., 2009) 
(analyzing research on the nexus of gender, violence, and small arms in devel-
oping and developed countries); Wendy Cukier, Global Effects of Small Arms: 
A Gendered Perspective, in IN THE LINE OF FIRE: A GENDER PERSPECTIVE ON 
SMALL ARMS PROLIFERATION, PEACE BUILDING AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
15, 17–18 (Women‘s Int‘l League for Peace and Freedom ed., 2001); Vanessa 
Farr, Scared Half to Death: The Gendered Impacts of Prolific Small Arms, 27 
CONTEMP. SECURITY POL‘Y 45, 51 (2006). See generally GENDER PERSPECTIVES 
ON SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS: REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CON-
CERNS (Vanessa A. Farr & Kiflemariam Gebre-Wold eds., 2002), available at 
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women‘s reality, the Supreme Court recently made the right to 
bear arms in the home a right recognizable against federal97 
and state98 regulation. Surely the fact that almost sixty percent 
of the nearly 650 million small arms that exist in the world are 
in private hands, most of them male, has implications for wom-
en.99 Data from the United States were used by the Human 
Rights Council to document the gendered dimensions of the is-
sues raised by small arms for human rights policy on domestic 
violence.100 ―[F]irearms are used in 59 per cent of all intimate 
partner homicides of women, and having one or more guns in 
the home makes a woman 7.2 times more likely to be murdered 
by an intimate partner.‖101 Amici in Heller tabled evidence that 
sixty to seventy percent of women killed by their male partners 
were murdered with guns, and that guns in the home presented 
―a constant lethal threat‖102 with terrorizing effects. This in-
formation, if powerful, was presented as a policy argument 
without legal equality dimension. 
Belying the self-defense justification that formed the basis 
for the Supreme Court‘s decision in Heller103 and McDonald,104 
 
http://seesac.org/sasp2/english/publications/1/Gender/1_Gender_Perspectives.pdf#
page=14 (providing comprehensive overview of how local gender ideologies de-
termine attitudes to small arms and underpin social and political practices 
that make women more vulnerable to violence everywhere).  
 97. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). 
 98. McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010). 
 99. AMNESTY INT‘L, THE IMPACT OF GUNS ON WOMEN‘S LIVES 2 (2005), 
available at http://controlarms.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/The 
-Impact-of-Guns-on-Womens-Lives.pdf (examining ―the impact on women of 
guns in the home, in communities and during and after conflict,‖ considering 
―violence committed with guns against women, the role women play in gun 
use, and the campaigns women are spearheading against gun violence‖); see 
also id. at 10–19 (exploring the impact of guns in the home on domestic  
violence). 
 100. Human Rights Council, Sub-Comm‘n on Promotion and Prot. of Hu-
man Rights, Specific Human Rights Issues: Prevention of Human Rights Viola-
tions Committed with Small Arms and Light Weapons, ¶ 36, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/Sub.1/58/27 (July 27, 2006) [hereinafter Prevention of Human Rights 
Violations]. 
 101. Id. (citing Nicolas Florquin & Christina Wille, A Common Tool: Fire-
arms, Violence and Crime, in SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2004: RIGHTS AT RISK 173, 
183 (U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics ed., 2004); James E. Bailey et al., Risk 
Factors for Violent Death of Women in the Home, 157 ARCHIVES INTERNAL 
MED. 777 (1997)). 
 102. Brief of Amici Curiae of National Network to End Domestic Violence 
et al. in Support of Petitioners at 26, 29, Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-
290).  
 103. Heller, 554 U.S. at 636. 
 104. McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010). 
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the international order recognizes the fact that ―research indi-
cates that firearms are rarely used to stop crimes or kill crimi-
nals‖105 but ―are often turned on the very person who may have 
the best arguments for self-defense—the woman herself.‖106 In 
the United States, the ―historical reality‖107 of what ―every 
man,‖ (1811)108 ―able bodied men,‖109 and ―all males,‖ (1939)110 
have perceived and wanted and expected supported a right to 
possess a firearm in the home, making them ―better able to res-
ist tyranny.‖111 That men at the same time became better able 
to exercise tyranny over women was not noticed by the Court; 
nor was what half the population might perceive, want, or ex-
pect, then or now, or its absence of being perceived. It is re-
markable to read of men‘s understanding of the common law of 
bearing arms at the time of the framing of the Constitution as 
supporting ―an individual right protecting against both public 
and private violence.‖112  
Justice Breyer, dissenting, recognizes women among those 
―particularly at risk‖ from gun violence.113 He understands that 
the point of the Fourteenth Amendment was primarily to era-
dicate discrimination rather than to incorporate federal rights 
 
 105. Prevention of Human Rights Violations, supra note 100, at ¶ 36, ¶ 36 
n.39 (―In 2003 only 203 justifiable homicides by private citizens using firearms 
were reported by the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation Uniform 
Crime Reports, including 163 with handguns. This number compares to the 
17,108 suicides, 11,829 homicides and 762 accidental deaths caused by fire-
arms in 2003, data compiled by the Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion.‖). In its most recent assessment, the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention reported 34,235 suicides and 25,423 homicides by firearm among 
U.S. residents. Violence-Related Firearm Deaths Among Residents of Metropol-
itan Areas and Cities—United States, 2006–2007, 60 MORBIDITY AND MORTAL-
ITY WKLY. REP. 573, 573 (2011). 
 106. Prevention of Human Rights Violations, supra note 100, at ¶ 36 (citing 
K.M. Grassel et al., Association Between Handgun Purchase and Mortality 
from Firearm Injury, 9 INJ. PREVENTION 48, 50 (2003)) (finding women who 
died from violence were more likely, not less, to have purchased a handgun in 
the three years preceding death). 
 107. Heller, 554 U.S. at 599. 
 108. Id. at 596 (referencing an 1811 letter from Thomas Jefferson describ-
ing the ―militia of the State‖ as including ―every man able to bear arms‖). 
 109. Id. at 595 (noting Webster defined ―militia‖ as being comprised of 
―able bodied men‖).  
 110. Id. (citing United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)). 
 111. Id. at 598. 
 112. Id. at 594. 
 113. McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3127 (2010) (Breyer, J.,  
dissenting). 
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against the states.114 But the two points never come together in 
the analysis that precluding discrimination in the Fourteenth 
Amendment sense requires facing the socially unequal distri-
bution of perpetrators and victims of gun violence on the basis 
of sex and gender. Justice Stevens even maintains that there is 
a weaker, not stronger, basis for restricting firearm possession 
in the home.115 An approach far better grounded in substantive 
reality, recognizing gender inequality, is that of the U.N. Secu-
rity Council, calling for inquiry into ―the interplay between 
armed personal protection and armed power projection‖ in the 
gendered context; facing the fact that ―[w]omen and girls are 
often gravely affected by small arms violence, through armed 
sexual violence, intimidation and coercion;‖ and finding 
―[g]ender approaches . . . particularly relevant for targeted poli-
cy interventions‖ in the area.116 
By contrast, in Crawford and Heller, Justice Scalia writing 
for the Court treats the common law at the founding as precise-
ly the ―brooding omnipresence in the sky‖117 that Justice 
Holmes said it was not, as does Justice Alito for the Court in 
McDonald.118 Claiming to discover the truth of the Second 
Amendment and the Sixth Amendment, entrenched before 
women were citizens, certainly before the Fourteenth Amend-
ment installed equal protection of the laws in the Constitution, 
the Court has made women‘s lives quantifiably more danger-
ous, heightening physical insecurity and legal impunity. In 
both areas, it was men‘s concern over the power of the state 
that gave rise to the rights in the first place. In both situations, 
these provisions are now being used to extend men‘s power over 
women with the backing of the state, with no inquiry into their 
abuse of power and use of coercion in the process. Batterers are 
legally armed, their victims legally further disarmed, in the si-
lence of the constitutional command that laws protect equally.119  
 
 114. Id. at 3133. 
 115. Id. at 3105 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 116. U.N. S.C., Small Arms: Report of the Secretary-General, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. 
S/2008/258 (April 17, 2008). 
 117. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 118. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3028–29 (Kennedy, J.) (relying on original 
intent to interpret the Bill of Rights); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 
570, 603 (2008) (Scalia, J.) (arguing the Second Amendment codified a ―pre-
existing right‖); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 46–56 (2004) (Scalia, J.) 
(using historical documentation of original intent to analyze the scope of the 
Confrontation Clause). 
 119. Perhaps the fact that the avatars of federalism are also here riding 
roughshod over state laws consciously framed to assist prosecution of batter-
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However doctrinally achieved,120 cognizance of the sub-
stance of gender could not leave these cases untouched. Cer-
tainly the ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women, a substantive 
treaty, would improve the climate as well as the legal founda-
tion for sex equality cases, as could an Equal Rights Amend-
ment. But so too would incorporating substantive reality into 
the Fourteenth Amendment‘s guarantee of equal protection of 
the laws.121 Substantive equality principles, rather than requir-
ing that reality fit existing legal equality interpretation, could 
transform inequality by recognizing substance—the reality of 
inequality—as what it is. 
 
ers deserves a footnote. The attorneys general of thirty-eight states reveal, 
should more evidence be needed, that federalism is an ideological convenience. 
See Brief of the States of Texas et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petition-
ers, McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 08-1521) (arguing that the Second 
Amendment prevents state and local governments from certain kinds of gun 
control legislation). 
 120. Specific doctrinal solutions or proposals would have to be specific to 
the substance and legal context of each problem; as such they are beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
 121. More women judges may help. In cases claiming sex discrimination, 
women‘s presence on appellate panels has been documented to make a differ-
ence for sex discrimination plaintiffs in federal cases. See Christine L. Boyd et 
al., Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 389, 
401 (2010).  
